ARTICLE: AN OVERVIEW OF THE PIPER ALPHA INCIDENT

As was discovered by Lord Cullen during his investigation into the Piper Alpha incident, the assumption that an Offshore Installation Manager (Superintendent) will know what to do during an emergency based upon the preface that he or she is a senior member of management is both a redundant and dangerous assumption.

The Piper Alpha oil platform was an impressive sight. Standing one hundred feet above some of the fiercest waters in the North Sea, lights sprinkled around the huge accommodation block designed to hold over two hundred men, gantries held aloft a burning torch, a proud symbol of the thousands of tonnes of oil it was pumping back to shore. In terms of money, Occidental Petroleum made approximately £3.5m ($6.25 Million US) a day from Piper Alpha which, at its peak, accounted for 10% of the UK's North Sea oil production.

For a worker on the Piper Alpha platform the night of July 6, 1988, the events that took place were absolutely terrifying. The panic and confusion that occurred during the emergency were amplified by the fact that many workers were new to the platform and had not received emergency training or participated in a full evacuation drill. In fact, a full evacuation drill had not been conducted for more than 3 years.

When the initial emergency occurred, workers in the Control Room were alerted by a series of gas alarms with the remainder of the personnel hearing the explosion or seeing the smoke. The gas explosion was, experts say, survivable for most of the men, apart from the one or two who were probably killed instantly.

Immediately, personnel began running through the installation in confusion which, in turn, quickly resulted in panic as the fire and explosions rapidly spread. With no clear instructions announced over the speaker system, workers tried to reach the lifeboat stations, but by now it was too late as all paths to them had been cut off. Those that did reach the lifeboat stations waited in vane for someone to tell them what to do or where to go, but command instructions never came.

Another group tried to reach the controls that would manually start the installations fire suppression system, whose automatic start feature had been disabled. However, they failed and none of them were ever seen again.

Personnel then began running to the accommodations area where they were temporarily protected from the heat and flame, however, not the choking smoke and explosions. Unfortunately, there was no blast wall to protect the accommodations area and so an oil fire quickly took hold. Bad communications also led to the failure of two other rigs to cease pumping into the same oil export line for more than 1 hour after the emergency started. By now the fire had escalated out of control and workers began lying on the ground with wet rags over their mouths and faces for protection.

At this point, a senior manager made an attempt to take command by standing on top of a table and yelling, but no one could hear him nor did they pay him any attention. By now, it was far too late for veiled direction. Many also hoped that a helicopter would be able to land, but from the first explosion this was impossible. Another man was heard to call out a repeated request for anyone who worked for the same company he did. When asked why he would do such a thing, he replied, "I didn’t want to die alone."

Some workers now realized that the only way to safety was to jump into the sea and so many ran to the railing and jumped one hundred and fifty feet to the surface of the water which by now was also on fire. Those who survived the jump alternated between staying underwater and keeping their heads in the smoke and fire above. Unfortunately, those who stayed behind died quickly of carbon monoxide poisoning.

In the end, 62 men were picked up from the water by helicopter and boat, many with severe burns and injuries. 167 more died. In just a few hours, Piper Alpha was reduced to a blackened, smoking, stump with most of the rig melting away and falling into the sea.

Estimates have since placed the cost to Occidental Petroleum at more than £8.5 Billion (15.2 Billion US).

“THIS COULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED”.

While the presence of better technical procedures may have eliminated the potential for the emergency to occur, the absence of an emergency management system in combination with poor, or little, training contributed significantly to onboard panic and the loss of so many lives, lives that could have been saved.

Therefore, the Offshore Emergency Management System (OEMS) for the Oil and Gas Industry has been developed to provide oil and gas companies with the necessary tools and complete processes that, when implemented effectively, will provide the operating company and their workers with something that those onboard the Piper Alpha never had, a chance.